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In this primary work we call for the importance of integrating security testing into the
process of testing digital forensic tools. We postulate that digital forensic tools are
increasing in features (such as network imaging), becoming networkable, and are being
proposed as forensic cloud services. This raises the need for testing the security of these
tools, especially since digital evidence integrity is of paramount importance. At the time of
conducting this work, little to no published anti-forensic research had focused on attacks
against the forensic tools/process. We used the TD3, a popular, validated, touch screen disk
duplicator and hardware write blocker with networking capabilities and designed an
attack that corrupted the integrity of the destination drive (drive with the duplicated
evidence) without the user's knowledge. By also modifying and repackaging the ﬁrmware
update, we illustrated that a potential adversary is capable of leveraging a phishing attack
scenario in order to fake digital forensic practitioners into updating the device with a
malicious operating system. The same attack scenario may also be practiced by a
disgruntled insider. The results also raise the question of whether security standards
should be drafted and adopted by digital forensic tool makers.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Introduction
There is an ever growing need for collecting digital evidence from media, especially from hard drives. As of 2004,
claims have been made that eighty to ninety percent of
cases in the United States involve some sort of digital evidence (Rogers, 2006b). Since 2004, no doubt, computing
devices have increased in ubiquity and decreased in size. A
logical assumption can be made that this percentage may
continue to increase, thus, upholding the notion for the
necessity of digital evidence collection in an accurate and
efﬁcient manner.

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: cmeff1@unh.newhaven.edu (C.S. Meffert), IBaggili@
newhaven.edu (I. Baggili), FBreitinger@newhaven.edu (F. Breitinger).
URL: http://www.unhcfreg.com/, http://www.FBreitinger.de/

Digital forensic investigation is deﬁned by Ieong (2006)
as “a process to determine and relate extracted information
and digital evidence to establish factual information for
judicial review”. If data on a disk drive can be considered
evidence then one may argue that the whole disk should be
considered evidence; both physically and digitally. If this is
to be the case then it becomes critical that the integrity of
the data is not compromised especially for the admissibility
of evidence into the court of law (Argy and Mason, 2007;
Accorsi, 2009; Givens, 2003). Landwehr (2001) deﬁnes
integrity conceptually as “assuring that digital information
is not modiﬁed (either intentionally or accidentally)
without proper authorization”.
Methods, procedures and tools exist to ensure that evidence maintains its integrity throughout the digital forensics process. The two prominent tools in use today are
software and hardware write blockers, with hardware
write blockers being the preferred tool of choice.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2016.04.004
1742-2876/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

S88

C.S. Meffert et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S87eS96

A software write blocker is a tool that handles write
blocking at the software level via the mounting process. It
ensures that the Operating System (OS) mounts the hardware with write blocking ﬂags set to on. Software write
blockers are easier to design and implement, but unless the
write blocking settings are handled at the lowest levels
possible (BIOS as an example), and the OS is secure, they
tend to be easier to subvert (Lyle and Black, 2005).
A hardware write blocker is a device that attaches a host
device (like a hard disk) typically to a forensic workstation
with the purpose of preventing any possible modiﬁcations
to the evidence drive before, during, and after the acquisition process. The name hardware write blocker comes
from how the device prevents the write function from
executing as it uses techniques for blocking writes to the
media.
A hardware write blocker typically operates by breaking
the bus that connects the hard drive to the host machine
into two segments; a bus segment between the host and
blocking device and another bus segment from the blocking device to the evidence drive. The two bus segments
may consist of different protocols. One can be Small Computer System Interface (SCSI) and the other Advanced
Technology Attachment (ATA). Once the devices are connected and the blocking device is powered on, all commands are intercepted by the blocking device. Once
intercepted, the blocking device will ﬁlter any write commands from passing (Lyle, 2006). The Tableau TD3 used in
this research is an example of a hardware unit that includes
a hardware write blocker.
Initially, hardware write blockers were devices that
simply blocked writes to disks after being connected to
forensic workstations when digital media was either acquired or mounted for triage (Rogers et al., 2006). As
products in this space continued to advance, devices
became smarter, more efﬁcient and packed with features.
Devices such as disk duplicators with built-in hardware
write blockers were developed to allow for use in forensic
labs as well as on the ﬁeld. As systems increased in size and
storage, the need to accomplish network forensic imaging
emerged. To tackle this challenge, these devices adopted
networking features.
With this advancement came many beneﬁts such as
remote access via a user interface and the ability to
remotely image a drive on a disk of interest. Tableau's TD3
model is one of these devices, and allows for browsing
drives that are attached directly to the write blocker via
the Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI)
protocol.1 iSCSI works on top of the Transport Control
Protocol (TCP) enabling the SCSI command to be delivered
end-to-end over Local Area Networks (LANs), Wide Area
Networks (WANs) or the Internet. The Ditto Forensic
FieldStation from WIEBETECH2 is another hardware write
blocker and disk duplicator that allows for remote cloning
and duplication of drives via iSCSI. Both devices allow for

1
https://www2.guidancesoftware.com/products/Pages/tableau/
products/forensic-duplicators/td3.aspx (last accessed April 11, 2016).
2
https://www.cru-inc.com/products/wiebetech/ditto_forensic_
ﬁeldstation/ (last accessed April 11, 2016).

creating and modifying users and the settings associated
with them.
Since most devices are proprietary and costly, an open
source hardware write blocker and forensic imager alternative was developed by the Digital Forensics Investigation
Research laboratory (DigitalFIRE) at University College
Dublin (UCD). Their project aimed at providing law
enforcement in underdeveloped countries with a cheap yet
effective substitute to expensive hardware write blockers.
The open source hardware write blocker and imager encourages practitioners to purchase the necessary parts,
download an open source application, and assemble a device titled FIREBrick. The cost for its parts is approximately
$2003 (Tobin and Gladyshev, 2015).
Nevertheless, provided that evidence integrity is of
paramount importance in digital forensics, we argue that it
is important to test the security of these devices given their
wide adoption by government and industry e especially
due to their increased features and network connectivity. In
this work the following contributions were accomplished:
 We present a primary study focused on the security of
these hardware imaging and write blocking devices (In
speciﬁc we tested the most widely adopted one e the
Tableau TD3).
 We illustrate how one may gain root access to such
equipment.
 We construct and share the results of a preliminary
proof of concept attack against the integrity of the imaging process when using the Tableau TD3.
 We raise the much needed awareness within the digital
forensics community for integrating security testing as
part of the digital forensic tool testing process since
digital forensic tool testing focuses on the accuracy and
correctness of the tools without accounting for plausible
security weakness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec.
Related work, a review of the related literature is shared,
setting the motivation for this work. In Sec. Tableau TD3,
the widely adopted device used in our study e the Tableau
TD3 e is presented. Sec. Methodology delineates the
approach of gaining root access to the TD3, the constructed integrity attack scripts, and the testing approach
used to validate the integrity attack. In Sec. Results the
results are presented, followed by the limitation of our
work in Sec. Limitations. The work presented is then
discussed in Sec. Discussion, and concluded in Sec.
Conclusion. Lastly, we open the door for future research in
Sec. Future work.

Related work
The following sections review works related to digital
evidence integrity. These works underpin the motivation
for exploring the security of the TD3 device.

3

http://digitalﬁre.ucd.ie/?page_id¼1011 (last accessed April 11, 2016).
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Digital evidence integrity
Maintaining evidence integrity in all investigative domains both physical and digital is of chief signiﬁcance. In
the digital domain, this means evidence remains unchanged while it is being acquired, authenticated and
analyzed. Although, one may argue that only minimal
changes should be made especially in the areas of Small
Scale Digital Device (SSDD) and memory forensics. Nonetheless, in traditional computer forensics, hardware write
blockers have become the golden standard for maintaining
the integrity of evidence during the acquisition and
authentication processes. Authenticating the copy of the
digital evidence is usually achieved via hashing functions.
Other forms of veriﬁcation may be utilized as well during
the course of an investigation such as visual veriﬁcation,
digital signatures, written documentation, Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRCs), encryption and other proprietary
methods (Cosic and Baca, 2010).
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A complete discussion regarding the aforementioned
taxonomy is beyond the scope of this article, however, it
is of note that should one gain root access to a forensic
write blocking/duplicating device, then many of the
anti-forensic taxonomy elements may be abused by a
potential adversary. Our work is most synonymous to
attacks against computer forensic tools and processes as
it aimed at testing the security of a write blocking/disk
duplicating device while consecutively hindering the
forensic process by tainting the integrity of the collected
evidence.
Dependency on tools is a weakness that is easy to fall
into. The issue with depending on tools is that while they
are helpful in expediting the forensic process, they are not
immune to attacks. One thing to consider is how tools
commonly used in digital forensics may be exploited using
anti-forensics, which is why tool testing is of paramount
importance to the digital forensics community.
Digital forensic tool testing

Anti-forensics
Anti-forensics relates to impeding the investigative
process through various means. There are examples of
research being conducted with regards to anti-forensics.
One example is the iSEC Partners fuzzing of Encase's software suite, which yielded several different bugs as a result
of software issues (Homewood, 2012). With that said, antiforensics work is often overlooked by digital forensic researchers as Baggili et al. (2012) pointed out that only 2%
out of their (n ¼ 500) analyzed scientiﬁc articles pertained
to anti-forensics. As a result of this lack of attention to antiforensics, research regarding hardware write blockers is
nearly non existent.
To the best of our knowledge, only one security issue has
been reported regarding hardware write blockers in the
media.4 The speciﬁc tool tested was a Ditto Forensic Field
Station.5 The attack vector was through the remote web
interface. Several Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks were
successful against the device.
As there are a number of anti-forensic tools and techniques available, Rogers (2006a) proposed the following
high-level anti-forensic taxonomy:
 Data hiding
e Encryption
e Steganography
e Other forms of data hiding
 Artifact wiping
e Disk cleaning utilities
e File Wiping
e Disk degaussing/destruction techniques
 Trail obfuscation
 Attacks against computer forensic tools and processes

4
http://www.heise.de/ix/meldung/Kritische-Sicherheitsluecken-inWrite-Blocker-entdeckt-2071582.html (last accessed April 11, 2016).
5
http://www.cru-inc.com/products/wiebetech/ditto_forensic_
ﬁeldstation/ (last accessed April 11, 2016).

Currently, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) is the most prevalent organization that
leads an extensive Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT)
program. They built their testing efforts around the
following overarching themes6: (1) Disk imaging (2)
Forensic media preparation (3) Write block (Software) (4)
Write block (Hardware) (5) Deleted ﬁle recovery (6) Mobile
devices (7) Forensic ﬁle carving and (8) String search.
Others have also conducted research on digital forensic tool
testing.
Baggili et al. (2007) suggested a mechanism for testing
mobile phone forensic tools. They proposed a systematic
database driven approach for testing mobile forensic tools.
By employing a database driven method, it allows researchers and academics to study error rates and ensures
cataloging of the testing process.
Guo et al. (2009) devised a method of mapping fundamental functions required in computer forensic processes.
Through this effort they were able to develop a functionally
orientated validation and veriﬁcation framework for
available digital forensic tools.
Other testing literature pertained to collecting images of
volatile memory to verify the accuracy of the tool being
used. In one unique approach, researchers adopted a visualization method involving dot plots (typically used in
bioinformatics) to evaluate the accuracy and amount of
interference of a forensic memory imager (Inoue et al.,
2011).
Bootable forensic environments were also explored for
their robustness and ability to provide reliable evidence for
a court of law such as the work by Mohamed et al. (2014). In
speciﬁc, they tested Knoppix v7.0, Helix 3 Pro 2009R3, and
Kali Linux v1.0. It is possible for the bootable media to
modify the hard disk. However, if modiﬁcations are predictable, and can be documented, it is acceptable to use the
tool. A differential forensic analysis (a term coined by

6
http://www.cftt.nist.gov/Methodology_Overview.htm (last accessed
April 11, 2016).
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Garﬁnkel et al. (2012)) was performed to compare pre and
post use of bootable forensic environments. The results
indicated that Helix 3 Pro 2009R3 was the most robust
system in terms of its forensic soundness.
New frameworks have also been proposed to test
various forensic tools. Work by Anobah et al. (2014) proposed a testing framework known as Maxwell, Oliver and
Shahzad (MOS) for mobile device forensics. The MOS
framework built on and extended the test plan from NIST. It
accomplished this by including assertions and new test
actions that cover anti-forensics as they pointed out a
weakness in NIST's framework is not accounting for antiforensics.
Work by Knüfer (2014) presents another possible
method for testing forensic tools. Their work attempted to
structure digital forensic tool testing using a schema based
approach with an effort of identifying vulnerabilities. In
their work they showed that their approach was well suited
to ﬁnd ﬂaws in digital forensic tools.
Given the wide adoption of TD3s, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) released a report about tests
conducted on the Tableau TD3. The report conveyed results
of primarily testing the device's forensic imaging and
indicated that the TD3 acquired all visible and hidden
sectors completely and accurately (DHS, 2014). Even
though these tests focused on the forensic accuracy of the
device's imaging function, the work did not account for the
fact that the TD3 is a networkable device that could
potentially be exploited, possibly tainting the forensic
soundness of the acquired evidence. In the upcoming Sec.
Tableau TD3, we elaborate on the TD3 device that was used
in this research.

Tableau TD3
The line of Tableau hardware write blockers from
Guidance Software provides a selection of portable forensic
imaging devices. These devices are stand alone allowing for
portability. The latest models typically have a user interface
allowing the user to control and interact with the device.
The TD3 model shown in Fig. 1 is of interest due to its
modular design and Graphical User Interface (GUI). Additionally, the device offers a web interface where users have
the ability to access it using a username and password. This
web based interface works in a standard browser as well as
a mobile browser.
The device is also capable of collecting forensic data
from Serial Advanced Technology Attachment (SATA),
Universal Serial Bus (USB) 1.1/2.0/3.0, Serial Attached SCSI
(SAS) and FireWire (1394A/B) drives.
Currently, the TD3 has two read/write ports, speciﬁcally
SATA and USB connections. It has read only ports for all
other connections described above. The TD3 also comes
with an integrated Ethernet port. This allows for the ability
to accomplish remote triage and network based imaging
and write blocking. The device also contains a Secure Digital (SD) card slot. This SD card contains the OS and without
it the device does not boot. The storage size of the SD card is
513.3 MB split into four partitions: three Linux partitions a
Linux swap partition and a Windows FAT 32 partition.

Fig. 1. Tableau TD3 hardware write blocker and disk duplicator.

While the TD3's ability to block write commands to the
evidence drive has been shown to be robust (DHS, 2014),
there remains other possible avenues to corrupt data on the
collection (destination) drive. The process of ﬁnding ways
to corrupt, hide, or destroy data falls into the realm of antiforensics (see Sec. Anti-forensics).
Methodology
This research adopted a methodology which embodied
the following three major steps:
Gaining root access: First, root access was required to
exploit the device. Therefore, we performed reconnaissance on the device (details in Sec. Reconnaissance) and
then replaced the ﬁrmware with a modiﬁed version (details
are presented in Sec. Firmware update process).
Integrity attack scripts construction: Next, the Gismo
process was identiﬁed. This process manages the calling of
the different applications, duplication, hashing, etc. A script
was developed to monitor Gismo and corrupt data when it
stops. This is discussed in Sec. Data integrity compromise.
The script can be downloaded from our website.7
Testing: Lastly, the script was tested and veriﬁed to
guarantee that it corrupted the integrity of the data on the
destination drive (see Sec. Testing).
Reconnaissance
In this stage of the methodology the TD3 was explored
to recognize the OS, open ports and ﬁlesystem structure.
When the TD3 was powered on, a boot up screen appeared
which did not provide information about the OS and only
indicated that a ﬁlesystem was loading. Once the loading
process completed, the GUI appeared.
The device was connected to the network and Network
Mapper v6.49 BETA 4 (NMAP) was employed to ﬁngerprint
the OS. The results yielded a Linux OS with a possible
kernel version of 2.6.32e3.10. Nevertheless, the exact

7
Script can be downloaded from http://www.unhcfreg.com under Data
& Tools.
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kernel version was determined only after gaining root access (see Sec. Firmware update process) and running
uname -r. In fact, the results showed that the TD3 used
kernel version 3.6.11.
To identify possible vulnerabilities (e.g., open ports,
services), we executed the NMAP command nmap -sS -sV
-T4 -O -A -v 10.101.1.149 which is the most invasive scan
one can run. The results showed that only port 3260 iSCSI
was open for ﬁrmware version 1.4.1. Using the same command after updating to ﬁrmware version 1.5, the following
open ports were discovered: 22 OpenSSH v5.8, 80
Lighthttpd v1.4.35, 443 Lighthttpd v1.4.35, and 3260 iSCSI.
This continued to be the case for all ﬁrmware updates
following version 1.5.
Per Guidance Software's website, the OS is kept on the
SD card. Mounting the SD card allowed for viewing and
modifying the root ﬁlesystem. The card consisted of a FAT
partition, two EXT4 partitions, and one swap partition. The
next logical step was to attempt an SSH login to the TD3. On
the ﬁrst attempt an error message was presented indicating
that only key exchange methods of authentication were
allowed for accessing the TD3 via SSH.
Mounting the SD card and modifying the OS
Initially, the SD card that contained the OS for the TD3
was mounted on a machine running Kali 2.0 Linux. After
the SD card was mounted, as a test, to examine if the
contents could be changed, the sshd_conf ﬁle was modiﬁed
and password authentication was enabled. An attempt was
then made to log into to the TD3 via SSH proving that the
ﬁlesystem could be modiﬁed by easily mounting the SD
card. Details on how the password for logging into the SSH
server was cracked is presented in Sec. Firmware update
process. Although this method was sufﬁcient for gaining
root access to the TD3 device, it was important to explore
other avenues of attack that a potential adversary may use
to trick a practitioner into modifying the TD3 without
physical access to the device. Therefore, the TD3's ﬁrmware
update was the target of choice.
Firmware update process
This section describes how the ﬁrmware update
installer was dissected and modiﬁed. It is worth noting now
that the ﬁrmware is digitally signed and while the modiﬁcations made were able to circumvent a hash match error, the
modiﬁcations did cause the digital signature to be corrupted.
More details on this are listed below. It necessary to share
all the tools used so the process could be replicated for
further investigation. Throughout this process, the
following tools were utilized (except for the Windows OS
all other tools were freely available):
 Microsoft Windows 7
 Kali Linux 2.0
 Tableau Firmware Update v7.13.msi8

8
https://www2.guidancesoftware.com/products/Pages/tableau/
products/forensic-duplicators/td3.aspx (last accessed April 11, 2016).
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LessMsi v1.49
Advanced Installer v12.6.110
Zip v3.0
GZip v1.6






The ﬁrmware update ﬁle was available via Guidance
Software's website as a Microsoft Installer .msi ﬁle. This
ﬁle is an executable but can be expanded to view and
extract its contents using Lessmsi v1.4. The extracted ﬁles
revealed another compressed ﬁle; td3-update-1.x.x. After
decompressing that ﬁle, three ﬁles; ext_datafs.gz, fat_datafs.gz and rootfs.gz were found. Extracting and mounting
the rootfs.gz yielded a set of ﬁles that could be replaced on
the device once the update was completed by modifying
the root ﬁlesystem.
Although a variety of attack vectors could be implemented in the ﬁrmware update ﬁle such as modifying the
TD3's web interface code to steal credentials, we chose the
low hanging fruit e to modify the SSH server conﬁguration
ﬁle as an example to test our ﬁrmware update exploit. The
server conﬁguration ﬁle was located in the /etc directory
and was conﬁgured to not allow password authentication
but key exchange only. After adjusting this setting, it
allowed for shell access with the correct username and
password.
At this point it was necessary to re-compress the rootfs
ﬁle and re-compress all of the ﬁles back into a .msi ﬁle
using Advanced Installer v12.6.1. We then ran the installer
in an attempt to move the changes to the existing ﬁlesystem on the TD3. This pushed the updated ﬁrmware v
1.5.0 to the TD3 but with the SSH server accepting password logins.
During and after the installation process there were only
two indications that something was modiﬁed. The ﬁrst
indication that anything had been modiﬁed was the digital
signature of the installer. The unmodiﬁed installer has
Guidance Software, Inc. listed as the publisher. Once
modiﬁed, the publisher was listed as unknown and Windows displayed a warning message indicating that the ﬁle
does not have a valid signature. Work by Sharek et al.
(2008) showed that of a sample size of 42 people 63%
simply clicked ”OK” on pop up boxes, simply just trying to
get them to close. If the person tasked with installing the
update was in a rush, or was not properly trained, there is a
high chance they will simply click what is necessary to
move forward.
The second was a single box warning that the installed
update did not match the hash of the original downloaded
ﬁrmware hash as shown in Fig. 2. To make the attack less
obvious to a potential victim, we modiﬁed the error message by manually changing the executable using a Hex
Editor to convince the user that the update was successful
as shown in Fig. 3.
One item remained for gaining SSH access to the TD3
device, which is the root password. John the Ripper password cracker v1.8.0.6-jumbo-1-bleeding-omp was used to
crack the root password. This was executed using the

9
10

http://lessmsi.activescott.com (last accessed April 11, 2016).
http://www.advancedinstaller.com (last accessed April 11, 2016).
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Fig. 2. Warning message after ﬁrmware update.

Fig. 3. Modiﬁed warning message after ﬁrmware update.

command unshadow on /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,
piping this into a text ﬁle (ﬁlename.txt) and then running
John on the output. If John succeeded in cracking a password
it dumped it to /.john/john.pot. Issuing the command john

–show ﬁlename.txt showed the username and password. In
this case for user root, the password was simply secret.
Finally, an attempt was made to log into the SSH server
with username root and the password secret and root

C.S. Meffert et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S87eS96

access was granted. This illustrated that our approach for
updating the .msi installer, and pushing the modiﬁed
ﬁrmware to the TD3 was successful.
Data integrity compromise
After root access was acquired, thinking like the bad
guys, an attempt at an integrity attack was designed. Initial
thoughts were to redirect the commands issued when a
process was selected via the GUI or to somehow modify the
commands to corrupt the integrity of the collection drive.
After gaining root access and logging in via SSH it was
possible to monitor the device's processes. Issuing the
command top11 allowed monitoring of the processes
running on the device. The goal of monitoring the processes
was to attempt to identify any critical processes when an
application was selected via the touch screen interface.

We were able to identify a spike in a process called Gismo,
which used up to 90% Central Processing Unit (CPU) capacity
during the disk duplication and hashing activities. When idle,
Gismo only consumed approximately 0.0%e1.0% CPU usage.
Gismo is proprietary software that appears to be
developed by Tableau to manage the applications provided
on the touch screen of the device. Gismo was taken as a
reference point. In other words, the %CPU use may be
constantly monitored with a script and thus used as a “ﬂag”
to launch malicious code.
Script construction and pseudocode
A script was written to monitor Gismo's Process ID (PID)
and when the process ramped down it issued the command dd if¼/dev/zero of¼/dev/sdXXX bs¼1M. This command corrupted the copied image on the destination drive
by overwriting the entire disk with zeros. This left the end
user unaware that data was being corrupted since the
process launched after the imaging process and veriﬁcation
stages were completed by the TD3.
When the TD3 runs the duplication process it generates a hash value at the end of its process. The script
only executes after it sees the CPU usage drop below 1%.
If the end user has the hash of the evidence drive and
compares it to the duplication hash generated it will

11
Top is a program that monitors the processes in Linux, similar to task
manager in MS Windows.
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appear to match. The data itself meanwhile was corrupted by the aforementioned command. Two scripts
were constructed to achieve this process. A bash script
was created that checked the PID of Gismo automatically
and then called the python script with the appropriate
PID.
In Algorithm 1, we present the pseudocode for the
main algorithm of the process.py script. The algorithm
executes a while loop that calculates the CPU percent for
the PID value passed in on execution of the script. It
then proceeds to check for a change in the CPU percent,
if this change has negative direction less than 10
percent and the current CPU percent is less than one
percent, the DD command was executed. If both of these
conditions were not meet, the previous CPU percent gets
assigned to the current CPU percent and the loop executes again.

Testing
Testing the result of the script was necessary to validate
this integrity attack. A full duplication was executed on the
TD3 and a hash on the collection drive was run to verify
that it was altered. The following tools were utilized in this
testing process:
 Two identical 2 GB USB Flash Drives. One contained a
ﬁle to be duplicated (source drive). The other was blank
(destination drive).
 TD3 Forensic Imager with custom ﬁrmware.
 Network with a Dynamic Host Conﬁguration Protocol
(DHCP) server enabled.
 process.py and callprocess.sh scripts loaded on the TD3
device (in the attack veriﬁcation stage).
 Computer with access to the same network the TD3 was
connected to and an SSH client installed.
The test procedure was broken into three phases (I)
calibration pre-ﬁrmware update (II) calibration postﬁrmware update and (III) attack veriﬁcation.
Phase I, the calibration pre-ﬁrmware update, the source
drive was ﬁrst hashed. A disk to disk duplication process
was completed from the source disk to the destination disk.
The destination disk was hashed to verify that both the
source disk and destination disk hash values matched post
duplication. They matched as expected. This conﬁrmed that
the duplication was successful and the integrity of the
process was validated.
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Phase II, calibration post-ﬁrmware update, was the same
as Phase I. We repeated the steps to verify that the modiﬁed
ﬁrmware update did not affect the disk to disk duplication
processes. Again, it was found that both the source drive
and the destination drive hash values coincided.
Lastly, in Phase III, the custom script was ﬁrst executed by
SSHing into the TD3 device, and then the disk to disk
duplication process commenced. After the disk duplication
completed, the TD3 showed to the user that the destination
drive hash value matched the hash values in Phases I and II.
However, when the destination drive was removed and
hashed, the hash value of the destination drive did not
match as expected, conﬁrming that our constructed script
indeed compromised the integrity of the collected evidence.
Results
During the calibration phase, the results clearly veriﬁed
that the TD3 operated as intended, and the hash values
were:

The results also clearly validated that the integrity of the
destination drive was compromised after running the
integrity attack scripts on the TD3 device. The hash values
from this testing phase are shown below:

From a vulnerability standpoint, the biggest challenge is
the need for physical access to the device. While convincing
somebody to push the modiﬁed ﬁrmware to the TD3 is not
out of the question, having access to the network by SSHing
into the device was the method utilized to execute the
scripts. Although this is a limitation in our initial work, one
may ﬁnd a method to automate the script and repackage
that into the ﬁrmware update.
On top of the needed physical access, with regards to the
ﬁrmware update process, both a digital signature warning
and a warning indicating that the ﬁrmware did not match
its hash value were presented. The hash matching error
was rectiﬁed by modifying the error message as discussed
in Sec. Firmware update process. The original warning
message is shown in Fig. 2 and the modiﬁed one is illustrated in Fig. 3.
In regards to the digital signature issue, it would take an
end user that is intimate with the installation and upgrade
process to possibly recognize this change.
Another limitation of this work is the constructed script.
The DD command corrupted the destination drive by
writing zeros to the entire disk. While this was useful in
proving the ability to execute a process when desired, a
more robust script would better hide its data corruption
method; making it less obvious to the end user that a
malicious anomaly has taken place.
Lastly, the nature of the TD3 embedded system is one
that has been stripped of its tool packages, leaving only the
bare-bone necessities to make the device function. This
makes it challenging to add any additional tool packages.
The only compiler that appears on the system is the Python
2.7 interpreter. It does contain a selection of packages to
accomplish most of the basic scripting tasks.
Discussion

The results conﬁrmed that the DD command was successful in its process of corrupting the destination drive.
Recall, the DD command was executed only after the
duplication and veriﬁcation processes were completed by
the TD3 as the goal was to corrupt the data whilst also
making the user believe that the data on the destination
drive was not compromised. To further validate this
method, the script was executed, and the destination drive
was removed even before the DD command completed its
task. This was done to conﬁrm that as soon as the hash
veriﬁcation process commenced by the TD3, and a hash
value is shown to the user, the script was still capable of
corrupting the destination drive.
Limitations
There are several limitations to this primary work along
with other limiting factors that makes future research
challenging.

It is important to note the severity of our ﬁndings and
articulate them in a scenario. One should understand that
most, if not all digital forensic companies send product
updates to their customers via e-mail. Links to updated
ﬁrmware or software are usually embedded into a nicely
formatted e-mail.
Now, imagine a situation where an adversary acquires
the e-mails of digital forensic practitioners (easy to do by
simply ﬁnding them on the web), and a phishing attack is
conceived. It is also important to recognize that many Law
Enforcement (LE) agency practitioners have only received
training for using digital forensic tools and many do not
possess a background in cybersecurity and/or computing.
The created phishing attack may target the list of e-mail
recipients and ask them to download a compromised
ﬁrmware update. The ﬁrmware may then be downloaded
by a victim practitioner, and the installation process would
be seamless. If this victim then attaches the compromised
device to the network, the network the device is on may
also now become compromised, plausibly allowing for
reverse shell access into the TD3. This type of social engineering attack is not that far fetched.
Mitnick and Simon (2011) in their book The Art of
Deception list many cases of social engineering that are far
more elaborate and complex than the scheme we

C.S. Meffert et al. / Digital Investigation 18 (2016) S87eS96

introduced. If the idea of socially engineering an end user to
update the ﬁrmware may seem like stretch, perhaps the
idea of the jaded insider is more convincing. Consider cases
such as the leak of classiﬁed material by Edward Snowden.
It is certainly not a stretch to believe an insider might be
persuaded to install an updated ﬁrmware.
Provided the above scenario, it becomes clear that the
limitation of physical access, while challenging to overcome, may be accomplished by tricking a victim into
installing a compromised ﬁrmware update.
Another point that needs addressing are the ramiﬁcations of a physical device like the TD3 being compromised.
The work developed in this paper was able to modify the
device and plausibly deceive an end user ultimately
affecting the authenticity of the acquired evidence.
As stated by Kerr (2001), before any party submits an
electronic record or evidence (disk drive), it must be shown
to be authentic and unaltered. Kerr (2001) also indicated
that hash values are an acceptable method to validate the
authenticity of a duplication. Currently, the script will allow
for a hash value to be generated that convinces the end user
of the authenticity of the generated hash value, while in
reality, the destination disk was altered.
If the script was modiﬁed to seek pertinent incriminating ﬁles and modify or delete only those ﬁles, the
consequence may appear less suspicious. It is likely that
many more of the tools in digital forensics will continue to
adapt features such as networking and remote access. As
these features become more prominent, so will the need to
test their security.
It is therefore of paramount importance for us to call for
integrating security testing into the digital forensic tool
testing process. We no longer live in a world where a
computer forensic lab is completely isolated from a
network. Network disk imaging is prevalent and devices
such as the TD3 will continue to be used. We are also seeing
moves towards a Forensics as a Service (FaaS) model, where
testing the security of these services will also be of paramount importance. We ﬁnally note that the TD3 was used
as a case study in our work due to its wide adoption by
practitioners worldwide and its accepted forensic tool
testing evaluation (DHS, 2014).
Conclusion
In this work, several goals were accomplished. Primarily, our goal was to test the security of digital forensic
tools. We used the TD3, a widely adopted forensic duplicator and write blocker device as a case study. We were
able to gain root access to the device, as well as modify the
ﬁrmware update, creating the possibility of a plausible
social engineering/phishing attack asking practitioners to
update their devices with a compromised ﬁrmware
update.
Furthermore, a method was presented by ways of using
scripts that run on the device, that trick a potential practitioner into believing that the hash value of the imaged
drive matched the source drive, however, as soon as that
process commenced, the destination drive's integrity was
corrupted. Our goal was to raise awareness for integrating
security testing into the digital forensic tool testing process,
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as more digital forensic tools are being used in networked
environments increasing the risk for adversaries to
compromise the digital forensic process/tools.
Future work
This work opens the door for the security testing of
forensic tools. We posit the importance of formulating a
methodology for integrating security testing into the digital
forensic tool testing framework and call on the community
to account for this ﬂaw. There is a body of knowledge that is
untapped on how penetration testing and digital forensics
intersect even though many consider them mutually
exclusive domains of knowledge. Additionally, we see a
need for developing concrete standards for the security of
both hardware and software forensic tools so that both
companies and researchers adhere to these standards
when constructing digital forensic tools.
In terms of the actual TD3 device, further analysis of the
processes running on the device to see if it is possible to
manipulate them is viable. For example, a Lighthttpd web
server is running on the TD3, so network analysis of the
trafﬁc may lead to other security shortcomings. As a preliminary test, the web interface ﬁles could also be found on
the device's ﬁlesystem, and manipulating them to intercept
credentials may be another avenue of attack.
Ways of also advancing the constructed integrity attack
script is also possible. For example, DD may be used to
reverse a ﬁle, write zeros into the middle of a ﬁle, or
truncate a particular amount of bytes from the end of a ﬁle.
A more elaborate script may also be designed to seek out
potentially incriminating ﬁle types or ﬁles with known
signatures in an attempt to modify or wipe them.
In terms of network imaging, exploring the possible
corruption of network images via network layer attacks
may also be tenable. Future work may also attempt to target
both software layer and hardware layer attacks against the
write blocked ports on the device, and not only the destination drives.
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